Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
with respect to Iran continue with no overt changes from early 2000: isolate and contain
Iran within the Middle East region and the world, seek regime change, and rely on United Nations sanctions to achieve U.S. and international policy goals. Contrast U.S.
policy objectives with a now nuclear armed Iran in 2015. This reality would mean greater Iranian power and influence within the Middle East, and would change the political dynamics with profound, irreversible consequences: The challenges created by a Middle East arms race to obtain nuclear weapons and the potential for Iran to provide a nuclear umbrella protection and capabilities to state and non-state actors. To avert this foreboding prospect, the U.S. must adopt a new strategic deterrence policy toward Iran, and a multi-lateral engagement strategy. The task to achieve tangible U.S. multilateral policy results will be daunting, while sufficing Iran's peaceful nuclear energy requirements, but it is a goal that must be attained for the security and stability of the world.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN -IS A NUCLEAR IRAN ON THE HORIZON?
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States (U.S.) will not allow these efforts to succeed. History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action. The U.S. must accept a grim reality that Iran is a major power in the Middle East.
Its regime foments instability with its neighbors and, by many accounts, wields influence that runs counter to democratic U.S. interests in the region. Despite Iran's professions that WMD are inconsistent with its ideology, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) says it is likely that Iran will eventually try to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran's factions appear to agree on the utility of a nuclear weapons capability as a means of ending its perceived historic vulnerability to U.S. domination and a symbol of Iran as a major nation.
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Iran's Motivation to Obtain Nuclear Weapons
Iran's nuclear program began in the Shah's era, including a plan to build twenty nuclear power reactors. 11 Central to Iran's nuclear facility infrastructure plans are the two power reactors in Bushehr, near Iran's capital of Tehran. Located on the coast of the Persian Gulf, they were started but remained unfinished when they were bombed and damaged by the Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq war. 12 "Research and development efforts also were conducted by the Shah's regime on fissile material production, although these efforts were halted during the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war." 13 In summarizing Iran's nuclear weapon ambitions, the Federation of American Scientists, a science-based group that closely monitors nuclear proliferation, stated the following conclusions.
Consensus is building among IAEA representatives. It is generally believed that Iran's efforts are focused on uranium enrichment, though there are some indications of work on a parallel plutonium effort. Iran claims it is trying to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle to support a civilian energy program, but this same fuel cycle would be applicable to a nuclear weapons development program. Iran appears to have spread their nuclear activities around a number of sites to reduce the risk of detection or attack.
14 In a thoughtful article in the most recent Yale Global Online, Arch Roberts Jr.
provides his insight on why Iran intends to pursue and achieve nuclear weaponization.
There's no plausible peaceful explanation for Iran's uranium enrichment program: The fuel for its first nuclear reactor at Bushehr will be provided by Russia, with a requirement that spent fuel, full of weapons-usable plutonium, will be returned to Russia. Plans for future reactor construction are well in the distance. So the non-bomb uranium Iran has produced to date has no purpose besides that of a nuclear "breakout" option: kick out the inspectors, run the uranium through the centrifuges several more times, work on missiles and other delivery means, and finish up with a couple of bombs. In the view of Iranian leaders, this posture improves Iran's strategic military perspective. sanctions that would allow them to import agricultural appliances and Boeing aircraft parts. 19  It may require a large conventional force to guarantee even a modest retaliation.
 Deterrence must always be conceived as a relative thing. It must be adequate to the variable but generally high degree of motivation which the enemy feels for our destruction.
 If deterrence fails we shall want enough forces to fight a total war effectively.
 Our retaliatory force must also be capable of striking first, and if it does so its attack had better be, as nearly as possible, overwhelming to the enemy's retaliatory force. 23 Brodie understood that an effective deterrence policy must have both the physical and psychological components for it to be viewed as credible by an adversary.
Simply stated, the litmus test for an effective deterrence strategy is the willingness to Excessive military costs will also be a drain on both economic power but also the social and political cohesion of the U.S., that make for its present greatness and its superiority over its rivals, and these elements are not to be taken lightly in preparing for the future. In short, plans for the deterrence measures of the future must seek to avoid unnecessary impairment of investment…  Offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear).
 Defenses (both active and passive).
 A revitalized defense infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging needs. The Defense Department plans to employ an evolutionary approach to the development and deployment of missile defenses to improve our defenses over time. The United States will not have final fixed missile defense architecture. Rather, we will deploy an initial set of capabilities that will evolve to meet the changing threat and to take advantage of technological developments. A modern model of deterrence needs to address the challenges posed by extremists and ideologues and accounts for the fact that traditional concepts of deterrence do not work against a terrorist whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents -deterring an idea or movement. Endnotes
